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Redistribution Dilemmas and Ethical Commitments:
Advisers in Austerity Britain’s Local Welfare State
Alice Forbess
LSE, UK
ABSTRACT
Situated in Cameron’s ‘austerity Britain’, this article explores contestations surrounding
financial responsibility and fair redistribution in a local authority office and an NHS
psychiatric hospital. Bureaucratic action is informed by simultaneously ethical and
economic calculations, but to enact public good values, bureaucrats must
circumvent material contingencies beyond their control. There is an ethical, even
utopian, pressure upon street bureaucrats in local offices of the welfare state to
deliver a fair outcome in the interests of all. At the same time, this is rendered
increasingly difficult by austerity regimes which erode resources. This article
examines how legal-style advice is used to handle such tensions. Advice is an
interface that can convert economic value into moral legitimacy and vice versa. This
ethnography explores advisers’ ‘ethical fixes’, which aim to enable the system to
operate more fairly, and the new forms of inequality which, paradoxically, emerge
from actions motivated by ideals of universal equality.
KEYWORDS Advice; austerity; bureaucracy; ethics; value
As welfare states increasingly shed their care obligations, and commitment to reversing
structural inequalities falters (Narotzsky & Besnier 2014), the values and principles that
shape popular understandings of the public good are undergoing radical changes, now
visible in global form (Bear & Mathur 2015: 1). One of the public good values that has
become increasingly influential worldwide as a result of this trend is fiscal accountability
(Ong & Collier 2005). In the United Kingdom, the austerity regime introduced by the
Cameron administrations, with the stated purpose of eliminating the national deficit by
2020, used this value as a justification for accelerating the rhythm of cuts to state
funding for public services. In particular, it sought to reduce the social security bill
by redefining key welfare benefits and radically cutting state funding for auxiliary ser-
vices, such as legal style advice, on which vulnerable people have come to rely heavily to
gain access to rights and entitlements.
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Prior to these cuts, the growth of a flourishing ‘cottage industry’ of advice services
increasingly essential to the functioning of the welfare state (James & Killick 2012;
Forbess & James 2014) had been fuelled by structural and historic conditions
peculiar to the UK (of which more below). The removal, in 2013, of most state
funding was expected to deal a death blow to such services. Face to face forms of
advice were expected to prove particularly vulnerable in an insecure funding
environment. Yet, whilst researching front line advice in 2014–2015, I was intrigued
to discover that, at least in some localities, face to face advice was proliferating. For
example, in Portsmouth, the local council had funded an NGO to provide unlimited
free face to face advice to all local citizens (the legal aid funded service it replaced
was available only to people on very low incomes). Simultaneously, offices of the
local and central state were developing novel forms of advice which assisted in
the extraction of resources from other parts of the state bureaucracy (Forbess &
James 2017). If austerity’s accelerated rhythm of cuts prompted state bureaucrats
to assume increasingly extractive roles,1 some were turning to advisers to assist in
diversifying the sources of revenue that could be captured, and speeding up the
rhythms of extraction.
Looking at advice as a technology of the imagination (Sneath et al. 2009) that can
convert economic value into moral legitimacy and vice versa, I argue that its ethical
and extractive potentialities are evolving in particular ways at the current historical
moment. By performing the labour of relatedness central to their work, advisers strate-
gically bring into play different value registers to achieve objectives that are simul-
taneously ethical and pragmatic. In the two settings explored here, a local council
office and an NHS hospital, advisers are developing the potentialities of advice not
just as an activity fuelled by an ethic of care (Kirwan 2016; Forbess & James 2017),
but also as an extractive technology capable of generating economic forms of value
clients, advice charities and their public and private partners.
For instance, the ethical value of fiscal accountability, used by the government to
justify the cutting of essential public services, is invoked by advisers and street bureau-
crats as a moral justification for new social investments. This value became influential
globally through its association with an economic model which foregrounds market
ethics, represented as simple, straightforward, universal and technocratically neutral
(Bear & Mathur 2015). But in everyday encounters with one another, state officials,
advisers and citizens strategically use it to support a bewildering diversity of ethical/
economic visions.2 Once it enters the social life of institutions, fiscal accountability
proves to be not so much a clear-cut blueprint that might guide a standardisation of
bureaucratic thinking and action along the technocratically neutral lines of market
ethics, as a ground of debate about the relationship between moral and material
forms of value.
In a recent article, Palomera and Vetta (2016) argue that, in discussions of moral
economy, there is a growing tendency to ignore structural conditions such as class
and capital. This has led to an excessive emphasis on the ‘moral’, with insufficient atten-
tion being paid to the complex links between ethical concerns and persistent structural
inequalities (see also Fassin 2009; Thompson 1991). They argue that moral economies
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should be understood in terms of diverse linkages between persistent inequalities and
popular understandings of justice, rights, entitlements and so forth. These are always
plural, ‘fields constituted by dynamic combinations of norms meanings and practices’
(Palomera & Vetta 2016: 414). Alexander et al. (2018) agree with this critique but
argue that it is also necessary to pay more attention to the roles of state and quasi-
state actors in such fields. This article explores how advisers attempt to mediate
between such state/quasi-state actors and citizens, enacting ideas of justice, rights
and entitlements in their attempts to address and redress structural inequalities
within an increasingly unequal austerity setting. Whilst, in public debates about auster-
ity, state bureaucrats are often portrayed as adversarial gatekeepers, this ethnography
highlights the ambiguities of their positions. Like Pia (2017) in his discussion of
Chinese Water Service officials, I take seriously the redistributive intentions embodied
in bureaucratic plans of action (Abram & Weszkalnys 2016), and explore the novel
configurations that arise from complex economic and moral contingencies as
officials, adviser-mediators and citizens strive to bring about the realisation of
different visions of social contract and public good (Bear & Mathur 2015).
This ethnography of advice encounters is located at the boundaries between insti-
tutions, where the clashes and reconciliations of different utopian projects and ideas
about the social contract (see e.g. Bear & Mathur 2015) become visible. This article is
divided into two sections, each centring on an ethnographic analysis of how advisers
and officials use the value of fiscal responsibility in their attempts to reconcile ethical
intentions and structural tensions. In the first example, situated in a local state office
dedicated to the administration of council tenancies, the technology of advice is
being used to extract resources not just (as previously) from tenants, but also, increas-
ingly, from other state bureaucracies on behalf of the tenants. Advice receiving tenants
are turned into conduits through which the local authority can access resources from
other parts of the welfare benefits system (Forbess & James 2017). This strategy
shifts the focus of extraction away from the tenants and onto the central state. This eth-
nographic example highlights the way in which advisers used market-oriented ethics,
including ideas like fiscal accountability and technocratic neutrality, to actualise huma-
nist-style ethical commitments.
In the second vignette, an adviser embedded in a local National Health Service
(NHS) hospital juggles the languages of fiscal accountability, technocratic professional-
ism and legal ethics to bring to life her ethical commitment to universal access to justice,
and to help redistribute streams of funding and revenue to the benefit of her clients. In
her everyday interactions with patients, hospital staff and local council officials, she per-
forms piecemeal fixes (Bear 2014) that sometimes augment and at other times compli-
cate relations between different institutions. Her commitment to legal-style
universalism (as she put it, ‘access to the law should be equally available to all’)
clashes with attempts, within the hospital and local authority, to enforce principles of
selectivity justified by the need for fiscal accountability. However, she also uses fiscal
accountability in her own arguments, pointing to the higher long term costs, for both
institutions, of refusing to help homeless psychiatric patients.
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Why Advice?
Advice is a proliferating domain of activity to which relatively little anthropological
attention has been paid so far. This special issue argues that this phenomenon offers
interesting insight into the contemporary transformations of welfare states. This is
especially true in Britain, where a large advice sector has been helped to flourish by
welfare state funding from the civil legal aid budget. One of the factors that account
for this growth is Britain’s complex, continually evolving common law system, which
is built around a premise of adversarialism.3 Traditionally, access to justice was contin-
gent on obtaining professional legal advice and/or representation.4 The architects of the
welfare state acknowledged this, making legal aid initially available to the majority of the
population (Biggs 2011). Whilst legal advice was initially delivered through private
practices and mostly focused on family law, in the 1970s law centres (legal charities)
staffed with solicitors specialising in social welfare law5 were established. From the
1980s onwards, the Thatcher and Major governments opened the bidding for legal
advice contracts to all NGOs, fuelling the growth of a diverse sector of advice-giving
charities (Moorhead 1998, 2001; Sommerlad 2008; James & Killick 2012; Jones &
Lowe 2002). Following an unsuccessful New Labour attempt to systematise this field,
Cameron’s Coalition government drastically cut legal aid funding for such services
by removing several areas of social welfare law from the scope of civil legal aid
(Forbess & James 2014).
I started researching legal advice services in 2011, just as the bill proposing radical
cuts to legal aid was passing through the House of Lords, and charities were campaign-
ing against it whilst preparing to cope with an uncertain future. Three years later I
returned to observe the effects of the cuts in the context of a larger study which explored
advice in a variety of institutional settings in London and Portsmouth – an NHS hos-
pital, a local council office, and a range of different NGOs including CABs, law centres, a
help at court scheme attached to a tribunal, and a charity providing a more holistic
range of services. The main research method was participant observation, documenting
around 200 meetings between advisers and clients. It was supplemented by semi-struc-
tured interviews with a range of key actors in the advice field, analyses of case notes and
other legal documents, following selected cases, and a survey of judges’ decisions at the
First Tier Tribunal – Asylum Support.
Many of the advisers I shadowed were paralegals trained by the CAB’s comprehen-
sive system, a key entry point to the profession. Others held professional qualifications
in specific areas of social welfare law (debt, housing, welfare benefits, immigration, etc.),
or were studying towards law degrees. In institutions with legal aid contracts, these
paralegals worked under the direct supervision of solicitors (a condition of the legal
aid contract), some of whom also participated in this study.6
Whilst legal studies scholars have examined the phenomenon of advice from the
point of view of access to justice (Bingham 2010: 37–47; Genn 1999; Moorhead 1998;
2001; Buck et al. 2008; Kirwan et al. 2016), this ethnographic approach highlights
how advice interacts with the workings of the ‘everyday state’. Although the state is
often spoken of in the singular, and citizens tend to perceive it as monolithic and
4 A. FORBESS
indivisible (Abrams 1988; Koch 2016), different branches of the ‘everyday state’ engage
with citizens in divergent and inconsistent ways (Fuller & Harriss 2001). In England
andWales, social security is administered by several bureaucratic institutions via a plur-
ality of offices, some belonging to the central and others to the local state. The main
social security agency is the Department of Works and Pensions (DWP), which admin-
isters a wide range of benefits. Local authorities provide housing and council tax sub-
sidies which are often correlated with DWP awards. In addition to these, tax
subsidies and Child Benefit are administered by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(HMRC), whilst the Home Office offers support for asylum applicants. There is no cen-
tralised database of applicants across these agencies (attempts to create one have so far
faltered owing to IT and other logistic difficulties). Different offices are expected to
cooperate in the provision of welfare, but they also compete over resources, and this
competition is exacerbated by austerity. Benefit claimants wishing to actualise their
rights must engage with each bureaucracy separately, mindful of their different sets
of rules, procedures, timelines, demands, eligibility requirements, and sanctions.
Since benefits administered by different offices are often contingent upon one
another, problems arising in one area often have unanticipated effects on others. At
the local level, as brokers, advice-givers attempt to find ways of traversing these gaps.
They force bureaucrats to communicate with each other, and may confront inadequate
decisions by taking more confrontational steps ending in litigation.
Advice in the Local State
Austerity has exacerbated competition over resources among different sections of the
state bureaucracy. As a result, various offices involved in the administration of
welfare seek to accelerate the collection of debts owed and, if possible, offload fiscal
responsibility for the vulnerable upon other arms of the state bureaucracy, third
sector organisations or the individuals concerned. In some cases, the methods used
to do this are surprising and novel. For example, in Portsmouth, the local authority’s
Housing Office, which administers council tenancies, has developed new forms of
extraction using the technology of advice. Fearing that the austerity cuts would cause
a rise in the number of tenants defaulting on their rent obligations, and preparing
for steep cuts to central government grant funding for local authorities, this office
had radically restructured its operations. But, unexpectedly, it did this not by cutting
the face to face advice offered to tenants, but rather by expanding it.
Located near a vast estate of terraced 1950s houses in one of Portsmouth’s satellite
towns, the Housing Office acts as social landlord7 to some 15,000 properties, the rem-
nants of a large council housing stock built after the war (now mostly sold off to pri-
vately managed housing associations). Seated side by side at long tables in the open
plan office are the manager, Charlie Hill, various administrative staff, a few accredited
debt advisers and several housing officers. Until the late 2000s, these housing officers
played the purely extractive role of pressuring defaulting tenants to pay their rent
arrears or attend financial counselling back at the office (as one money adviser observed,
they ‘used advice as “a beating stick” to get people to pay up’). Now, they had been re-
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trained as welfare benefit advisers who visited struggling tenants’ homes to help them
maximise their income. The advice on offer was more comprehensive than previously,
focusing not only on re-establishing the flow of rental monies, but also on capturing
additional resources from other benefits-administering bureaucracies, thus increasing
revenues for both tenants and the Housing Office. Unusual at a time defined by auster-
ity cuts, this expansion of face to face advice was part of a reorganisation of office oper-
ations inspired by a managerial approach called ‘systems thinking’ (also known as the
Vanguard Method), which had been originally developed in the Japanese car industry
(Deming 1993) and later adapted for public service bureaucracies (Seddon 2008).
Most tenants’ rents are heavily subsidised through Housing Benefit (HB), a fund
administered by another local authority office, but this subsidy is contingent on receiv-
ing benefits from the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), a separate, central
state agency. Whilst eligibility for Housing Benefit comes automatically with DWP
benefits such as Jobseeker’s Allowance, retaining these benefits is contingent upon
meeting DWP-set conditions (such as job-seeking commitments). If, for instance, a Job-
seeker’s Allowance (JSA) recipient fails to attend a job interview, this triggers the sus-
pension of the JSA and Housing Benefit. Once this happens significant effort and
resourcefulness is needed to restore them: one must liaise with the DWP and HB
offices separately, contest sanctions, appeal decisions, obtain the right evidence, apply
for retrospective payments, and so on. Meanwhile, rent arrears can quickly mount,
leaving not only the tenant, but also the local authority’s Housing Office, out of pocket.
Housing Office manager Charlie Hill championed the introduction of benefits advice
after realising that ‘many tenants struggle to meet their responsibilities because they’re
not getting everything they are entitled to from the DWP’. This institution, Charlie
suggests, is deliberately obstructive: ‘they could do away with 90% of the form filling
by using face to face appointments to determine what [benefits] people are eligible
for’. Instead, they focus on gatekeeping tactics: ‘the benefits system is not designed to
help people claim what they are entitled to, but rather to stop them claiming what
they are not entitled to’. This creates demand for advisers to help translate the pro-
fessional jargon of forms into laymen’s terms.
Such tactics, Charlie observes, actively create debt (and loss of revenue for his office).
For instance, it is common for the DWP to ‘hit’ tenants with ‘overpayment demands’
(benefits sums retrospectively deemed to have been paid in error). These are recovered
from Housing Benefit, leaving a rent liability. Chronic bureaucratic error at the DWP
compounds the problem: ‘there is a 60–70% rate of overturning decisions in Benefits
Tribunals [but] the DWP is unwilling to learn from mistakes. No learning goes back
from the tribunal’ to the DWP. Instead, ‘what gets said is that people can achieve
justice. But if the work was done right in the first place there would be no need for
it. The benefits bill is reducing, but at what cost?’
InCharlie’s view, the problemwith this way of imagining fiscal accountability is one of
scale. Instead of actually reducing costs, the DWP passes them on to local authorities and
the justice system. If costs were evaluated on a wider scale, it would become apparent that
they are being passed on from one section of bureaucracy or budget heading to another.
According to Charlie, this short-sighted approach to fiscal accountability, common in
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public services, backfires because it is concerned more with meeting targets than under-
standing and addressing people’s actual needs. For instance, in his previous role as ‘per-
formance review officer’ at the council, he discovered that although offices were ‘in the
top quartile of the Best Value Performance Regime, the council surgeries were full of
people complaining’, suggesting ‘that the performance indicators were wrong’.
Bureaucracies use techniques of management as a way of materialising their own
particular versions of the social contract between the state and citizens (Bear and
Mathur 2015). Charlie explained his vision in managerial and strategic terms,
drawing contrasts to the ‘command and control’ NPM model prevalent in UK public
services (Taylor Gooby 2006, 2008). He pointed out that a poorly designed system
could thwart the best intentions of individual officers: ‘generally people come to
work to do a good job [but] if it’s a good person against a bad system the bad
system wins.… The introduction of targets is demoralising people in a lot of public ser-
vices… [Their] power never fails to amaze me. It’s killed people in hospitals’. Yet, Char-
lie’s technocratic utopia also included more ‘humanistic’ aspirations to actualise ideals
of fair redistribution: ‘we [in public services] are hung up on on-size-fits-all services,
[and] this means that everyone at least gets a crap service. I am interested in a
system where people are getting what they need’.
As Bear (2014) observes, the contemporary politics of the public sector and of debt
reduction emphasise a dystopic representation of capitalist time as a danger to the
realisation of value. A model of governance ‘as a medium for the speedy circulation,
redistribution and accumulation of value’ is gaining in dominance. Charlie and his
staff repeatedly observed that the earlier ‘command and control’ system had generated
chronic stagnation and waste, whilst the current model accelerated the resolution of
cases. This helped to stem the escalation of tenants’ debts, but it also increased the
speed of their evictions. ‘With the new approach we get tough, but we follow
through, issuing possession notices and setting court dates’. The threat of legal action
was used as leverage to responsibilise tenants, but leniency was shown, and help
offered ‘if there is commitment’. In such cases, ‘we…make sure [people] are getting
everything they are entitled to benefits-wise in order to maximise their income’. This
was seen as a way to create trust: ‘the feeling you are interested in helping’, a scarce com-
modity in public services (Taylor Gooby 2008).
The reconfiguration of this bureaucracy’s modus operandi can be seen as an example
of the economisation of the state explicitly connected to the new public good of fiscal
austerity. But it would be wrong to conclude that this was merely a cynical attempt
to extract more cash from tenants, using humanistic ethical values associated with
advice as window dressing. Whilst it is true that advice was being used as a technique
of governmentality to speed up time and the realisation of value, it also acted as a
conduit for alternative ethical commitments, allowing them to flourish inside these neo-
liberal advice forms.
The utopias that inform bureaucratic life are enacted through managerial strategic
plans like Charlie’s but also through the everyday performance of professional roles.
Through their professional performances vis-a-vis tenants, advisers subtly reshaped
the utopian scenarios and value sets that informed their work. For instance, housing
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officer Ellie viewed her new advice role as an opportunity to enact a humanist-style
commitment ‘to help people’. This, she said, eliminated some of the negativity she
experienced as a local state official. But she still felt tensions between her roles as
adviser and official acting as a conduit of the local state. ‘When you ask about debts,
it’s often very personal and it will take time for people to open up’ she told me. ‘As a
PCC housing officer, you have to make people understand there are reasons to do
this, it’s not just arbitrary action’. For instance one tenant ‘had learned to keep her
head down’ and appeared not to ‘give a toss’, but after extra income was secured for
her, she told Ellie: ‘I trust you’. ‘If you put people in the position where they have
options, they are grateful’, Ellie observed. ‘It shows that you can get rid of the demor-
alising aspects of the job and build intrinsic value into the work.’
This ethical complexity and diversity of motives was further illustrated when I
accompanied Sian, another housing officer/adviser on a home visit. A man in his
sixties severely crippled by fused bones in his spine, this tenant was completely
unaware that he had fallen into rent arrears as a result of a bureaucratic mistake at Job-
centrePlus (JCP, the local arm of the DWP). Upon arrival we discovered Sian was not
the only adviser to visit his home: a woman claiming to work for JobcentrePlus had also
been ‘helping him’. This made Sian suspicious: ‘why has the issue not been resolved if
she saw you repeatedly? Beware of giving people access to your bank account. Don’t tell
anyone you keep money around the house’. After checking progress on the JCP
problem, Sian helped the tenant apply for another benefit for which he had not
known he was eligible. He told me he was thankful but also baffled: why had the
council not merely ‘taken the rent arrears out of [his] account, to which it had
access? There was plenty of money in there’. ‘No’, Sian answered, ‘that would not be
fair. You are entitled to receive this [DWP] money, you shouldn’t have to pay it your-
self’. In taking this stance she was enacting notions of justice and fairness – and holding
the state financially accountable to the tenant. Advice is a technology of the imagination
(Sneath et al. 2009) capable of clothing extractive efforts in an aura of moral legitimacy
by identifying them as part and parcel of the worthy project of helping vulnerable
people. But at the same time, face to face advice encounters have the potential to gen-
erate fresh and unexpected results, allowing moral economies to influence the trajectory
of resources in unexpected ways.
Cross-cutting Rights Regimes
The expansion of forms of advice to new areas across the state and private sectors can be
seen as an instance of the spread of ‘non-binding coercions’ associated with the increas-
ing pervasiveness of ‘soft law’ (Zerilli 2010). The result, in this case, was the emergence
of multiple, overlapping advice regimes (belonging to the PCC Housing Office, Jobcen-
tre Plus, the NGO Advice Portsmouth, etc.) which, though perceived as different by the
advisers themselves, were less easily distinguished by the people offered such services.
This seemed to be a growing trend. At a meeting of local council and NGO advisers,
it was announced that the Ministry of Justice was taking over the regulation of bailiff
companies in an attempt to stem abuses of power. It planned to do this by splitting
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the professional roles of bailiffs in two. In the first instance, the bailiffwould arrive at the
debtor’s house to ‘offer support’ in the role of ‘welfare officer’ (debt adviser). If the offer
was ignored, the bailiff would return as ‘enforcement officer’ to collect the debts.
Housing Office advisers at the meeting wondered how this could be ethical: would it
not create a confusion of roles and, by ignoring the conflict of interest, generate distrust
of advisers generally? At the same time, similar concerns were being raised about their
own work (as described above) by advisers in third sector organisations. ‘I’ve always
wondered’, asked Moira, who worked for the local charity Advice Portsmouth, ‘if
they do all the financial advice, do they then also do the evictions?…How does it
impact their work with clients? Are they distrustful? Do they [think] the council
officer will choose to evict them… ? If there is pressure to get people signed up,
other problems often get missed’.
However, like many other advisers, Moira’s complex professional biography crossed
sector lines. Advice work is often represented as grounded in an independent third
sector ethos and dedicated to challenging state and private sector abuses of power,
but in the course of their careers, advisers often move across sector boundaries. Sian,
for example, had started her career in the private sector, working for a housing associ-
ation, then moved to the state sector. Moira had completed the CAB’s training pro-
gramme but then spent a long interlude working in the state and private sectors.
This included 10 years working for the DWP in a variety of capacities, being rotated
across all the different positions on offer (fraud investigator, benefits assessor, finance
officer, employment adviser and so forth) providing her with a thorough understanding
of the workings of this central state department. She had also worked for a local auth-
ority before returning to the third sector because of the greater flexibility and indepen-
dence it offered: ‘often, charities can’t afford to increase salaries and give extra leave each
year plus flexi-hours’. But she decried the blurring of inter-sector boundaries, seeing it
as a threat to the values and independence of the third sector. After the CAB where she
worked brought in private sector consultants ‘to make the business side of the charity
more profitable’, she quit.
Owing to constant institutional churn, it is quite likely that a person employed as
state official at one point may be a former NGO adviser and vice versa. Such mobility
allows advisers to experience a variety of institutional settings, gaining complex under-
standings of different institutional cultures, values and roles. Being able to draw on such
diverse value registers is useful in orchestrating their interventions but sometimes advi-
sers’ structural position at the interface of different institutions, and their expectations
of independence, can make tensions hard to avoid.
When I first met her, Moira worked for a Portsmouth NGO funded by the city council
to offer free legal advice to all local citizens. Two days a week, she ran a legal surgery in the
local psychiatric hospital, where she gave intensive legal advice to patients. The hospital
consisted of several wards run by separate teams, each with its own budget. Many patients
progressed from the locked ‘secure’ ward, through to the acute ward, dedicated to stabi-
lising people, and the day care ward, which offered some a further six weeks of outpatient
therapy. Many patients were admitted repeatedly, often because there was not enough
support available to help them make a successful transition back to normal life.
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Because mental illness made it difficult to cope with the paperwork, telephone gateways,
deadlines, delays and unpredictability of the benefits system, many patients were home-
less and unable to access the benefits to which they were entitled.
Most of Moira’s work was located in the acute ward, devoted to stabilising patients
and moving them on quickly. Owing to the shortage of beds, patients were often dis-
charged with less than a day’s notice. Whilst the law had previously banned hospitals
from discharging people homeless, it had been changed to relieve the chronic shortage
of beds. Now, homeless patients on this ward had at best a few days and at worst a few
hours to secure some form of accommodation from the council before ending up on the
streets. Local authorities have a statutory legal obligation to house certain categories of
vulnerable people, including mental patients, but strong medical evidence is needed to
gain a place at the top of the Housing Register waiting list. The legal tests8 such evidence
should meet were not normally understood by patients nor, Moira discovered, by the
hospital staff that provided the evidence. This meant that unless Moira was present
on the day someone was being discharged, they were unlikely to obtain the evidence
needed to be housed.
For their part, council officers were reluctant to accept emergency housing appli-
cations because they were a great drain on council resources, since successful applicants
often had to be housed in bed and breakfast accommodation9 for lengthy periods, until
more permanent housing could be found. Given these pressures, a housing solicitor
who advised local authorities told me that many of them went to great lengths to
avoid accepting responsibility for the housing of vulnerable people. Some subcontracted
the processing of housing applications to private companies, meaning that decision-
makers never met applicants face to face. Others pressured staff to make same day
decisions, thus eliminating the duty to provide interim accommodation. In light of
these facts, Portsmouth City Council seemed unusually lenient in its handling of appli-
cations, with decision-makers (case managers) interviewing applicants face to face and
taking weeks to collect and check evidence in support of applications. Even so, few
applicants were successful without an adviser. As Moira observed: ‘the way [some
officials] speak to people is intentionally discouraging. A housing officer told my
client “this [evidence] might show you are in priority need, but it probably won’t,
and you’re likely to be found intentionally homeless”’ (see also Wilde, this issue).
However, if the applicant ‘returns “lawyered up”, they tend to accept applications
and give interim accommodation because of the threat of legal review’. Moira cultivated
first-name-basis relationships with many case managers, often alluding to a shared pro-
fessional pride in doing one’s job well. She pointed out that gatekeeping behaviour was
due largely to a genuine dearth of resources: ‘a few years back when the council had its
own temporary accommodation facilities, it was brilliant. But that was sold off. One is
aware that local authority resources have been cut again and again’.
During Moira’s first week at the hospital, a suicidal young woman was discharged
and sent to attend a council housing interview unrepresented. Noting that she lacked
the right medical evidence (a risk assessment) and acted seriously disturbed, the
council official10 sent her back and re-admitted to the hospital. Moira used this case
to press for a change in the hospital’s discharge practices, arguing that it was not
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fiscally accountable because it undermined the gains of treatment and cost more
because of frequent readmissions. Whilst members of the hospital staff complained
she was ‘getting involved in issues not to do with [me]’, she argued this was, neverthe-
less, the crux of her role ‘[I] work for the client, that’s [my] remit… I feel obliged to
intervene even if it creates awkwardness. It’s difficult, but when people are having pro-
blems because the system is falling down, you can’t just sit there and say nothing’.
It was thus that Moira found herself in the paradoxical position of using the value of
fiscal accountability to push for more expenditure by the council and hospital. To ease
the pressure, she did her best to speed up housing applications, informally carrying on
information gathering for the council’s case managers. She telephoned them at every
step to explain the meaning of diagnoses, how the symptoms affected claimants,
what kind of accommodation might work, and when evidence would be forthcoming.
To streamline the housing application process, she talked to the council about setting up
protocols for psychiatric patients, and tried to persuade hospital staff to use a form letter
including all the information needed by the council (‘the diagnosis, care plan, medi-
cations and a mini risk assessment explaining what type of accommodation would be
suitable’).
In ‘normal hospitals’, Moira argued, this job was assigned to a discharge team who
‘meets with the patient three days before discharge and start the process of getting them
accommodated’, but ‘unusually’ this hospital lacked such arrangements. Whilst hospital
staff found it convenient to leave Moira and a colleague in charge of discharge work, she
argued it was improper for her to take on this role because she did not have the clear-
ance to obtain the necessary information, and was present at the hospital only two days
a week (so people discharged on other days would miss out on this crucial service). At
her insistence, a benefits adviser in the hospital’s employment was named ‘discharge
coordinator’, but a few months later she told me it was still unclear ‘how official the
deal is. Half the staff on ward seem to forget we are here to represent the client, not
to coordinate discharges. Dan is going on holiday, [but I am not sure there is
another] member of staff on hand to take over his role’.
Moira saw her role within the hospital as that of an independent actor representing
the interests of clients. But at the same time, she was pressing for her own insertion into
the hospital’s knowledge economy. This included access to the computer database,
allowing her to obtain information needed for her letters (including clients’ diagnoses
and medication), and to enter her own notes, thus notifying staff of the patient’s legal
needs and chart any progress in securing him/her a source of income and place to stay
upon discharge. This integration was not going well: her email access was still failing
months later, and the rooms where she met patients often changed, and rarely con-
tained a working telephone connection, computer and printer needed to prepare
official letters and chase up benefits applications. Worst of all, towards the end of my
research (2015), the main body of the hospital was sold off to build luxury flats,
leaving Moira with a desk in a large room full of other employees.
Ideally, Moira would have liked hospital staff to take on a legal style role because, as
she told a nurse: ‘you have the client’s authority, so you need to provide [evidence the
council needs]…As long as someone has made a homeless application, the ward and
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council should be able to liaise directly’. But nurses argued this was beyond their remit
and that bureaucratic burdens interfered with the performance of their care role. ‘When
they are also trying to do their job looking after patients, paperwork falls by the
wayside’. According to Moira, ‘perhaps because they deal with patients’ medical
needs, ward staff feel there should be another tier [dealing with] discharge’. Their reluc-
tance to be involved, she suspected, may also been due to misunderstanding: ‘[some
ward staff] are panicked by the high-falutin title of ‘risk assessment’. They assume
risk assessments should be done only for people with risky behaviour, but the
council requires them for everyone who is housed’. Nurses shied away from the extra
paperwork partly because they were already overloaded with bureaucratic duties: ‘the
prospect of filling in a long risk assessment and care form puts them off doing it’.
But as Moira observed, ‘they could do [the council-required risk assessment] in one
letter [and thus avoid having] to fill in all the other plans and forms the NHS provides’.
At the same time, if emergency housing applicants attended council interviews without
the right paperwork, they were sent back to the hospital, resulting in longer stays and re-
admissions. Some nurses blamed Moira for this, complaining that ‘patients could not
expect to ‘stay in hospital to resolve their housing problems’. Moira concluded: ‘the
whole philosophy of the ward is short-termist. All they have to do to attend to the
longer term needs is a few bits of extra paperwork’. To streamline the paperwork
required, Moira and her colleague wrote a form letter including all the information
required by the council, which was approved by the matron, but nursing staff
seemed reluctant to adopt it.
Dan, a welfare benefits adviser already in the hospital’s employ, appeared reluctant to
followMoira’s lead, and sometimes seemed inclined to side with the nursing staff. In the
case of Rex, a suicidal patient whose condition was exacerbated by his housing pro-
blems, Dan and the nursing staff felt it was improper to keep him in the hospital
whilst he applied for council housing, arguing that ‘he attempted suicide because he
has real problems, not mental illness’. Moira nevertheless insisted on getting paperwork
for a council housing application, a task which was Dan’s responsibility, in his role of
discharge coordinator:
Moira: Who would be the best person to [write a letter confirming diagnosis]?
Dan: I’m not sure who writes them, maybe the ward staff?
Moira: The ward staff don’t write letters, they always refer me back to you.
Dan: I think it’s because the diagnosis would have to come from a medic. He has to sign it.
Moira: Right, so how can we cobble a letter together with everything on it?
Dan: Maybe D. can write them. Probably in the end it will come back to me.
Moira: When it’s an instant discharge like this, we can’t get the information we need for the
council. My concern is if he goes back to his flat the landlord’s toughs will continue
harassing him.
Dan: Well that’s where he’s being discharged to… If you have any problems give us a
shout, I can sort it out but I’d prefer it if it came from a medic.
Moira: As long as the letter has the NHS logo it’s OK.
The contestations around how best to address patients’ needs were exposing rifts
between different conceptions of fiscally accountable ethics of care. Moira was not a
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lawyer herself, but she looked to a principle of legal universalism ‘everyone should be
equal before the law’ as an absolute guiding idea for her work. Even when cases
seemed completely hopeless, if a client asked for her help, she would do her utmost
to provide it (for instance, she did not even turn down a schizophrenic woman who
wanted to be housed by the council despite already owning her own home, because
she thought her home was haunted). Meanwhile, Dan seemed more inclined to be selec-
tive. Each morning, when he told Moira who would need help, he focused on some
patients over others – usually downplaying the needs of people with histories of vio-
lence, aggressive behaviour to staff, prison convictions.
Value registers within the legal and medical professions, in terms of which Moira
and Dan conceptualised their respective professional roles, were invoked in the con-
testation over how (and whether) help should be rationed. Dan and some of the
nurses seemed to feel compelled to apply some form of selectivity and prioritising
care to people whose needs were deemed most urgent. This was consistent with a
climate of scarcity within the NHS, and with a medicalised approach to care, but it
also overlapped with other, more personal, ideas of deservingness. For instance one
of Moira’s success stories was Norman, a victim of long term abuse with a history of
self-harm and suicide attempts. When Moira helped him obtain council housing
against all odds (he was not homeless), nurses complained that other patients were
more deserving. They suspected Norman of exaggerating his condition and tried repeat-
edly to discharge him before his housing application was decided, saying that he could
not expect to be in hospital in order to socialise (he had really blossomed through
friendships he had formed with other patients). At the same time, Moira’s ‘piecemeal
fixes’ were convincing other, key members of staff, of the value of her approach. One
example included the acute ward matron’s deciding to investigate the background of
a severely depressed woman who had been on the ward for a long time, and who
refused to speak to anyone. When nurses visited her home they discovered she had
completely ‘fallen off the radar’ in terms of any income or social care and apparently
survived with no money at all for over a decade.
An adviser with wide-ranging experience of the workings of state welfare bureauc-
racies, Moira is trying to embed itself in a quasi-state institution (an NHS trust)
whilst at the same time angling for greater independence. She justifies this position
in reference to an ideal of universal access to justice couched in a legal idiom – everyone
should be equal before the law. But this clashes with other redistributive principles at
work within the NHS, based on the need to prioritise care – and other forms of assist-
ance – to those who need them most. Advisers like Moira are aware that, in the absence
of adequate resources, their piecemeal ethical fixes can only give rise to new forms of
inequality.
Concluding Remarks
In debates around austerity, values such as fiscal accountability tend to be represented
as blueprints for technocratic action at the forefront of a trend towards the economisa-
tion of ‘the political’. However, this ethnography shows that when such values enter the
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life of public institutions, they can be pressed into the service of a variety of disparate,
even contradictory ethical/economic projects, becoming objects of intense debate and
contestation. In the two ethnographic examples presented here, advisers and other
officials, whilst enacting their professional roles, reshaped the ways in which fiscal
accountability was understood and applied to situations on the ground.
Genuine redistributive intentions can be part of the performance of fiscal responsi-
bility. For instance, there is a strong current in UK public services which argues for
more ‘front-line’ investment as a way of cutting long term financial as well as human
costs. The systems thinking approach adopted in Charlie Hill’s Housing Office is an
example of such an initiative, adding more services at a time when the prevailing aus-
terity logic would seem to require they be cut. But manager Charlie Hill also favoured a
neoliberal-style rhetoric of responsibilisation which downplayed power inequalities
between landlord and tenant. The housing officer-advisers under his command
keenly felt such structural tensions and sought to offset these by actualising humanis-
tic-style ideals of helping people, and of holding the state to account on behalf of
tenants. Variations between different situated viewpoints within the office enhanced
the ambiguities which made a variety of outcomes possible to each of the ‘piecemeal
fixes’ attempted by advisers, but at the same time they helped obscure persisting and
widening structural inequalities of austerity.
Used as an interface that converts economic value into moral legitimacy and vice
versa, advice brings together ethical and extractive potentialities which are evolving
in particular ways at the current historical moment. In their mutual everyday encoun-
ters officials, advisers and citizens may come to invest in, as well as question or challenge
each other’s moral projects. Some of the innovations this ethnography documents stem
from the adoption of the technology of advice by state and quasi-state actors as a way of
diversifying and accelerating the extraction of resources, but also as a way of materialis-
ing genuinely redistributive intentions – and developing fairer forms of redistribution in
austerity times.
But at the same time, owing to the marginal position of advisers, at the interface of
different institutions, and an engrained sense of independence nurtured by ethical
positions prevalent in the third sector and legal profession, the outcomes of advice
encounters prove difficult to control, often producing fresh and unexpected results.
Yet, the ultimate scarcity of good advisers and time means that the ethical fixes
that can be performed only serve to highlight the wider problem, and the emerging
inequalities between those who are lucky enough to secure advice and those who
are not.
Palomera and Vetta (2016: 414) frame moral economies as ‘fields… through which
structural inequalities produced by particular forms of capital accumulation are metab-
olized’. They argue that such fields can have a significant impact on patterns of capital
accumulation, whether to reinforce or ‘short-circuit’ or alter them. In this article, I have
tried to show how such alterations can be brought about within state and quasi-state
bureaucracies by actors who try to inhabit their professional roles, and the ‘utopian’
visions embedded in institutional plans, by hatching moral/economic schemes that
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attempt to turn the tables on austerity. Owing to the fluidity of their role, advisers can be
highly instrumental in such ‘metabolic’ operations.
Notes
1. For instance local authorities – themselves squeezed by funding cuts – have, in recent years,
become more proactive in shaping the nature of advice services. They do this in part out of
empathy but also as a way of maximising their income. Like other funders, they are shifting
their funding of third sector organisations from grants to commissioning contracts. In setting
up these commissioning mechanisms, some local authorities have reconfigured these in innova-
tive ways as means to both to provide advice and ensure their own coffers are not depleted.
2. For example whilst some officials used this value to justify cuts, others invoked it to support the
expansion of local services, taking the view that they would produce savings in the longer term.
3. In such systems the judge plays an impartial role and cannot investigate, but must only rule on
evidence presented by the advocates representing the opposing sides.
4. One attempt to remedy this problem was the creation of a system of tribunals designed to consider
without the need for representation – the standard of evidence is lower than in normal courts, and
judges are allowed to depart from their traditional role by questioning witnesses and gathering
evidence (Cownie et al. 2007: 71–83). This role is more similar to that of magistrates in continental
justice systems than to the traditional role of UK judges, which is predicated on impartiality and
restricted to ruling on evidence presented by the two sides. Social security, housing, employment,
asylum and other social welfare law appeals are heard in such fora. However, inequality of arms
remains a problem in these hearings, which are often decided on quite technical points of law that
appellants are unable to argue. Government departments almost always send professional rep-
resentation to tribunal hearings, whilst most appellants appear unrepresented. For instance, a
two month survey of judges’ ‘Statements of Reasons’ (decisions) carried out by myself at the
Asylum Support First Tier Tribunal showed that the government department being challenged
(the Home Office) was professionally represented in about 95% of the cases. Professionally rep-
resented appellants were significantly more likely to succeed than those who attended hearings
alone or submitted only documentary evidence (Forbess 2016).
5. The term social welfare or ‘poor man’s law’ covers the areas of the law most relevant to vulner-
able people, including debt, housing, social security, employment, education, immigration, and
asylum (see Biggs 2011; Moorhead & Robinson 2006).
6. Most solicitors work in law centres, which are legally required to employ a high proportion of
lawyers. However, most law centres work mainly by referral.
7. A part of the local authority or council, this office administers public-owned housing assigned to
local citizens who are considered particularly vulnerable.
8. Each local authority (council) has its own, slightly different evidence requirements. Portsmouth
City Council (PCC) requires the following documentation: proof of a qualifying immigration
status; proof that it is unreasonable to return to the property the person previously lived at
and/or that s/he will be homeless; proof the person has priority need (here vulnerability evidence
is crucial); proof the person has a local connection, and to establish that the applicant has not
caused his or her own homelessness.
9. This was due to the fact that the council, having sold its housing stock, did not own spaces where
they could be housed.
10. Moira sympathised with the official’s point of view: it’s important to find the right accommo-
dation [to] support recovery, so they need to know what might work for her’.
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